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With the beginning of the fall quarter of this year the first class which
entered the law school under the four-year curriculum, inaugurated in
'1938, enters upon its fourth year studies. To meet the added teaching
burden imposed upon the faculty, especially by reason of the seminars
in which each student must now be enrolled, two members have been
added to the law faculty this year.
Associate Professor Robert L. Taylor, B.A. 1927, Yale University,
J.D. 1930, Northwestern University, taught in the law schools of Val-
paraiso University and the University of Louisville after several years
as an officer of an Illinois bank. During the past year he was Sterling
Fellow at Yale University, where he did graduate work in law. Professor
Taylor's field is commercial law, and he will teach the courses in Bills
and Notes, Insurance, and Public Utilities as well as joining with Pro-
fessor Shattuck in conducting a seminar in Banking Law and Advanced
Problems in Security.
Assistant Professor Conrad W. Oberdorfer, LL.B. 1939, Northwestern
University, LL.M. 1940, Harvard University, comes to the law school
from Boston, Massachusetts, where he was associated in the practice of
law with Herrick, Smith, Donald and Farley. Professor Oberdorfer
will specialize in the field of public law, teaching the courses in Admin-
istrative Law, Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure, and Debtors' Estates
and a seminar in Government Regulation of Business.
COMMENTS
THE RIGHTS OF CORPORATE CREDITORS UPON UNPAID
AND WATERED STOCK SUBSCRIPTIONS'
There is a marked distinction between the purpose of an action
instituted by a corporation while it is a going concern to recover unpaid
subscriptions, and such an action instituted by a creditor or receiver'
after insolvency.5 In the former, the primary object is to collect money
to further the business and purposes of the corporation and to con-
tinue it as a going concern. The corporation, but not a creditor, may
proceed against any shareholder who has not paid for his stock in
full, to recover the balance, whether or not such balance is necessary
to pay the obligations of the corporation, and independent suits may
be begun against different shareholders. The corporation may sue
part of the shareholders only, and it is no defense to such actions that
there has been no marshalling of assets and liabilities, or that all of
the delinquent shareholders have not been proceeded against. 4 But
when the corporation becomes insolvent, the positive legal liability
existing while the corporation was a going concern is transferred into
an equitable liability5 on the theory that these unpaid claims, on the
corporation's insolvency, become part of a trust fund,6 and that it
would be inequitable to collect more from the shareholders on their
obligations than is necessary to satisfy the corporation's debts.'
'Decisions uniformly grant to the corporate creditor the right to compel
payment of unpaid subscriptions to the extent necessary to satisfy his debt.
Barnard Mfg. Co. v. Ralston, 71 Wash. 659, 129 Pac. 389 (1913); Dunlap v.
Rauch, 24 Wash. 620, 64 Pac. 807 (1901); Adamant Mfg. Co. v. Wallace,
16 Wash. 614, 48 Pac. 415 (1897); Hatch v. Dana, 191 U. S. 205 (1880);
Ogilvie v. Knox Ins. Co., 59 U. S. 577 (1859); Blood v. La Serena Land
& Water Co., 150 Cal. 764, 89 Pac. 1090 (1907); Singer v. Hutchinson, 183
Ill. 606, 56 N. E. 388 (1900); 13 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS (3rd
ed., 1932) § 6051.
'Chamberlain v. Piercy, 82 Wash. 157, 143 Pac. 977 (1914).
As against creditors, a corporation is insolvent when it is unable to
pay its debts in due course of business. Smith v. Solomon Valley Dredg-
ing Co., 147 Wash. 69, 264 Pac. 1009 (1928); McKnight v. Shadbolt, 98
Wash. 665, 168 Pac. 473 (1917); McKay v. Sperry Flour Co., 95 Wash.
209, 163 Pac. 377 (1917); Ronald v. Schoenfeld, 94 Wash. 238, 162 Pac.
43 (1917); Nixon v. Hendy Machine Works, 51 Wash. 419, 99 Pac. 11 (1909).
Gaunce v. Schoder, 145 Wash. 604, 261 Pac. 393 (1927); Chamberlain
v Piercy, supra note 2.
'A suit by the receiver of an insolvent corporation to recover unpaid
subscriptions in an equitable proceeding. Gaunce v. Schoder, supra note 4;
Chamberlain v. Piercy, supra note 2; Gordon v. Cummings, 78 Wash. 515,
139 Pac. 489 (1914); Lantz. v. Moeller, 76 Wash. 429, 136 Pac. 687 (1913);
Adamant Mfg. Co. v. Wallace, supra note 1.
6 Atwood v. McKenzie-Waterhouse Co., 120 Wash. 214, 206 Pac. 978
(1922); Hosner v. Conservative Casualty Co., 99 Wash. 161, 168 Pac. 1122(1917); Miurphy v. Panton, 96 Wash. 637, 165 Pac. 1064 (1917); Chamberlain
v. Piercy, supra note 2; Lantz v. Moeller, supra note 5; Davies v. Ball,
64 Wash. 292, 116 Pac. 833 (1911); Cox v. Dickie, 48 Wash. 264, 93 Pac.
523 (1908); Dunlap v. Rauch, supra note 1; Manhattan Trust Co. v. Seattle
Coal & Iron Co., 16 Wash. 499, 48 Pac. 333 (1897); Adamant Mfg. Co.
v. Wallace, supra note 1; Patterson v. Lynde, 106 U. S. 519 (1908); Scovill
v. Thayer, 105 U. S. 143 (1882); BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS (1927) § 199
et. seq.
" See note 2, supra.
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Usually there are constitutional or statutory provisions defining and
regulating the shareholder's liability to pay creditors on the insolvency
of the corporation. Under such provisions the amount of the liability
is the difference between either the agreed price or the full par value
and the amount actually paid for the stock, to the extent that such
payment is necessary to satisfy their claims." In the absence of such
provisions, a similar common law liability exists, based upon various
theories.9
The.term "unpaid stock" embraces two distinct fields: (1) stock
subscription contracts on which payments have not been completed,
and (2) "watered" or bonus stock where the corporation has agreed
to accept insufficient cash or property as full payment for the issued,
stock. Although the method of recovery in each case is similar, the
theories of liability differ.
There are two theories of liability on unpaid stock, both of which
have been followed by the Washington court: (1) the trust fund
theory ° and (2) the assets theory." Under the trust fund theory,
the capital stock of a corporation is treated as a trust fund for the
payment of its debts in the sense that when the corporation is insolvent,
all of its creditors are entitled in equity to have their debts paid out
of the corporate property before there is any distribution thereof among
the shareholders. Under the assets theory, unpaid subscriptions are
treated as contractual obligations like any other assets of the corporatiou
,when it becomes insolvent, and may be collected through the inter-
position of the equity court, for the purpose of paying its debts.
"Watered" or bonus stock involves no unpaid subscription contract
and liability to creditors must be placed upon grounds othex than con-
tract. The courts quite universally enforce this liability, 2 but on
different theories:
(1) Trust fund theory-the assets of the corporation must be pre-
served as a fund for the payment of debts as against withdrawal by
shareholders." This theory fails to explain the rights of creditors
8 The nature, extent and condition of a shareholder's liability is deter-
mined by the law of the state of incorporation. Harrigan v. Bergdoll, 270
U. S. 560 (1926).
WASH. CONST., ART.- 12, § 4: "Each stockholder in all incorporated com-
panies except corporations organized for banking or insurance purposes,
shall be liable for the debts of the corporation to the amount of his
unpaid stock .. ."
WASH. LAws 1933, c. 185, § 20; Rnm. REV. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 3803-20:
. 2. A shareholder of a corporation... shall not be personally liable
for any debt or liability of the corporation except every shareholder is
individually and personally liable for the debts and liabilities of the
corporation to the full amount unpaid on any subscription to shares of
stock made by him."
9 Note (1935) 33 Mic. L. Rnv. 1059.
20 Atwood v. McKenzie-Waterhouse Co., supra note 6; Taylor v. Spur-
way, 16 F. Supp. 566 (S. D. Fla., 1936); BA LLANmi, Co0P oATAoNs (1927)
§ 199 et seq.
"I Guaranty Trust Co. v. Satterwhite, 2 Wn. (2d) 252, 97 P. (2d) 1055(1940); Guaranty Trust Co. v. Scoon, 144 Wash. 33, 256 Pac. 74 (1927);
Hosner v. Conservative Casualty Co., supra note 6.1 2 BALININE, CoapoaATONS (1927), § 210 et seq.
"'The trust fund doctrine is described in Hospes v. N. W. Car Mfg. &
Car Co., 48 Minn. 174, 50 N. W. 1117, 15 L. R. A. 470 (1892). It is not recog-
nized in New York, where contractual liability for stock subscriptions
1941]
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where the corporation itself has no right or asset against the share-
holder because bound by its contract with the shareholder.
(2) Fraud, or presumed reliance theory-the gist of the creditor's
action is held to be that he was induced to extend credit to the cor-
poration by false representations of the corporation respecting the
amount paid in by the shareholder to corporate capital.14 This seems
to be the majority theory, and under it only creditors who have relied
on the fictitious misrepresentation can recover. A subsequent creditor
who has dealt with the corporation with full knowledge, cannot recover,
nor can one who contracted with the corporation prior to the issue
of watered stock. 5 A minority view makes no distinction between
classes of creditors.
(3) Statutory obligation theory-the requirement of full payment
is based on an inference from the statutory and limited liability priv-
ilege; hence liability is not affected by knowledge of the creditor, or
by the fact that the creditor is prior or subsequent. The basis of the
sharejholder's liability is not any misrepresentation of fact as to the
amount paid in, but an obligation imposed by law on the shareholder
to contribute capital as an incident of membership in a limited liabil-
ity corporation. The law assures to those dealing with the corporation
that the whole of the subscribed capital shall remain available, for
the discharge of its liabilities except as diminished by business losses.
The duty to contribute is imposed by law and is an asset of the cor-
poration which may be called a "trust fund" in the sense that the
corporation cannot dispense with or release it as against creditors.16
The Washington court has relied on all three theories at different
times. The trust fund theory as applied to watered stock was followed
in Adamant Mfg. Co. v. Wallace.1 The fraud theory was the basis
of liability in Scovill v. Thayer,18 cited in Elderkin v. Peterson,9
although it was also worked out on the trust fund theory. In Johns v.
Clother,2 the trust fund theory was mentioned, but the court also held
that the constitution and statutes create a liability as a matter of law
to the extent of the par value of the stock from the very fact of
subscription, regardless of any attempted limitation of the contract
of subscription. A somewhat similar rationalization was introduced
in Guaranty Trust Co. v. Satterwhite,2 1 where the court held that the
alone is enforced. Jeffery v. Selwyn, 220 N. Y. 77, 115 N. E. 275 (1917).
The doctrine is explained in STEVENS, CORPORATIONS (1936) § 178; BALLAN-
TINE, CORPORATIONS (1927) § 199.
"H Handley v. Stutz, 139 U. S. 417 (1891); Coit v. Amalgamating Co., 119
U. S. 343 (1886); First Nat. Bank v. Gustin M. C. Min. Co., 42 Minn. 327, 44
N. W. 198 (1890); BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS (1927) § 212.
"5 Chandler v. Miller, 172 Wash. 252, 19 P. (2d) 1108 (1933); Atwood v.
McKenzie-Waterhouse Co., supra note 6; Walton Lbr. Co. v. Commonwealth
Lbr. Co., 95 Wash. 295, 163 Pac. 762 (1917).
16 Cooney v. Arlington Hotel, 11 Del. Ch. 286, 101 Atl. 879 (1917); Easton
Nat. Bank v. American Brick & Tile Co., 70 N. J. Eq. 732, 64 Ati. 917
(1906); BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS (1927) § 213; STEVENS, CORPORATIONS
(1936) §§ 178-179; Note (1935) 33 MIcH. L. REV. 1059.
17 Cf. Lantz v. Moeller, supra note 5; Davies v. Ball, supra note 6; Dunlap
v. Rauch, supra note 1.
"'See note 6 supra.
"9 8 Wash 674, 36 Pac. 1089 (1894).
20 78 Wash. 602, 139 Pac. 755 (1914)
21 See note 11 supra.
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acceptance, of bonus stock carries an implied promise to pay for it if.
it becomes necessary to do so, thus putting liability back on the con-
tract basis along with unpaid subscriptions.
In the absence of express statutory authorization, the creditor's in-
direct relation to the subscription contract precludes an individual
creditor's suit at law to enforce the subscriber's liability for an unpaid
amount.
22
By statute or judicial decision, a creditor's bill in equity after an
unsatisfied judgment 28 against the corporation has been established
as the normal device for the collection of this asset .2  Most courts
hold that a creditor's bill, while it need not make all creditors actual
parties, must be brought on behalf of all who may come in, on the
ground that when the corporation is insolvent, the equity court looks
on all assets as a trust fund for all creditors, and no one creditor may
go into equity and appropriate such assets exclusively to himself. 25
Even where the bill is not brought on behalf of all creditors, other
creditors have the right to come in and share in the, distribution. Where
the bill is brought on behalf of all who may wish to come in, other
creditors must come into the action if they wish to enforce their claims,
for they cannot thereafter bring separate suits. 26
Be.cause of the defects of individual remedies, and since creditors'
resort to unpaid subscriptions is only necessary when the corporate
assets are insufficient to meet debts, the collective process is the more
desirable procedure to enforce a creditor's right to satisfaction from
unpaid subscriptions. The Washington court holds that a proceeding
in equity by a receiver against all unpaid shareholders is the proper
method of relief for complaining creditors.27 Under the common form
of remedial statute obtaining in Washington,2" any creditor (not
22 Montesano v. Carr, 80 Wash. 384, 141 Pac. 894 (1914); Burch v. Taylor,
1 Wash. 245, 24 Pac. 438 (1890); Patterson v. Lynde, supra note 6; First
Nat. Bank v. Peavy, 69 Fed. 455 (C. C. N. D. Ia, 1895); Beach v. Beach
Hotel Corp., 117 Conn. 445, 168 Atl. 785 (1933).2 5Chamberlain v. Piercy, supra note 2; Lantz v. Moeller, supra note 5;
New York Nat. Exchange Bank v. Metropolitan Say. Bank, 28 Wash. 553,
68 Pac. 905 (1902); Adamant Mfg. Cb. v. Wallace, supra note 1.
2' It is not necessary first to obtain a judgment against the corporation
when it is otherwise shown that such a proceeding would be utterly
futile. Chilberg v. Siebenbaum, 41 Wash. 663, 84 Pac. 598 (1906). Insol-
vency of the corporation itself justifies a creditor's suit, without first
getting a judgment. Peeples v. Hayes, 4 Wn. (2d) 253, 104 P. (2d) 303
(1940).2 5 Montesano v. Carr, supra note 24; BArLANTnE, CoRPoRATioNs (1927)§ 200.
"FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPPORATIONS (3rd ed. 1932) §§ 6201, 6537.2 7 Montesano v. Carr, supra note 22; Cox v. Dickie, supra, note 6;
Mitchell v. Jordan, 36 Wash. 645, 79 Pac. 311 (1905); New York Nat Ex-
change Bank v. Metropolitan Savings Bank, supra note 23; Elderkin v.
Peterson, 8 Wash. 674, 36 Pac. 1089 (1894); Wilson v. Book, 13 Wash. 676,
43 Pac. 939 (1876).
28 WASH. LAWS 1937, c. 47, § 1; REML REv. STAT. (Supp. 1937) § 741: "A
receiver may be appointed by the court in the following cases: . . . 5.
When a corporation has been dissolved or is in the process of dissolution
or is insolvent, or is in imminent danger of insolvency, or has forfeited its
corporate rights, and when the court in its sound discretion deems the
appointment of a receiver is necessary to 'secure ample justice to' the
parties;.. .1
1941]
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only a judgment creditor) 29 may, on the insolvency of a corporation,
procure the judicial appointment of a receiver, who thereupon becomes
invested with the rights and title of the corporation 30 for the purpose
of collecting assets for the benefit of all assenting creditors, and who
can compel payment of unpaid subscriptions to the extent necessary
to satisfy creditors.3
There are two divergent methods of procedure by a receiver, de-
pending on the statutory provisions and equitable practice of the par-
ticular jurisdiction.
(1) The theory that the receiver is entitled to collect the unpaid
subscription price as any other corporate obligation in order to marshal
assets upholds the power of the receiver to proceed at law or equity
against all of the delinquent subscribers without a judicial ascertain-
ment of existing debts. On the collection of all available assets, equita-
ble adjustment of the rights of creditors and shareholders is made by
the appointing court.
32
(2) Because of legislative, and judicial emphasis on the proportionate
liability of subscribers to creditors on corporate insolvency, before
a receiver's recovery of this type of asset, it is necessary to have a
judicial determination of the extent of the subscriber's proportionate
liability. Mechanically this is fixed by means of an assessment pro-
ceeding instituted in the appointing court by the receiver to compute
the amount of the debts and available assets of the, corporation, and
to levy a pro rata assessment on delinquent subscribers to the extent
necessary to satisfy outstanding claims.3
29 It is the insolvency of the corporation that constitutes the ground
for receivership, and no other condition. Kreide v. Independence League
of America, 188 Wash. 376, 62 P. (2d) 1101 (1936); Snyder v. Yakima
Finance Corp., 174 Wash. 499, 25 P. (2d) 108 (1933); Smith v. Solomon
Valley Dredging Co., supra note 3; Blum v. Rowe, 98 Wash. 683, 168 Pac.
781 (1917); Davis v. Edwards, 41 Wash. 480, 84 Pac. 22 (1906); Oleson v.
Bank of Tacoma, 15 Wash. 148, 45 Pac. 734 (1896). A receiver cannot
be appointed to collect unpaid subscriptions where the corporation is
solvent. Bergman Clay Mfg. Co. v. Bergman, 73 Wash. 144, 131 Pac. 485
(1913).
" The receiver can have no greater right than the corporation would
have had, unless it is affirmatively shown that rights of creditors existing
at the time were prejudiced thereby, Murphy v. Panton, supra note 6;
Walton Lumber Co. v. Commonwealth Lumber Co., supra note 15.
31 Republic Iron & Steel Co. v. Carlton, 189 Fed. 126 (C. C. D. Md. 1911);
Van Arsdale v Richards, 247 Ky. 77, 56 S. W. (2d) 728 (1933); Geigy Co.
v. Wilfling, 50 R. I. 506, 149 Atl. 609 (1930).
" Hundley v. Hewitt, 195 Ala. 647, 71 So. 419 (1916); Cosmopolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Sheats, 20 Ga. Ap. 622, 93 S. E. 507 (1917); Graves v. Denny,
15 Ga. Ap. 718, 84 S. E. 187 (1915); Meholin v. Carlson, 17 Idaho 742, 107
Pac. 755 (1910); Preston v. Jeffers, 179 Ky. 384, 200 S. W. 654 (1918);
Bank of Kaplan v Richards, 165 La. 659, 115 So. 815 (1928); Jackson Fire
& Marine Ins. Co. v. Walle, 105 La. 89, 29 So. 503 (1900); Guilbert v.
Hessinger, 173 Mo. Ap. 680, 160 S. W. 17 (1913); Pope v. Merchant's Trust
J. P. Co., 118 Tenn. 506, 103 S. W. 792 (1907).
33 Guaranty Trust Co. v. Satterwhite, supra note 11; Johnson v. Pheas-
ant Pickling Co., 174 Wash. 236, 24 P. (2d) 628 (1933); Connor v. Robin-
son, 137 Wash. 672, 246 Pac. 758 (1926); Rea v. Eslick, 87 Wash. 125, 151
Pac. 256 (1915)-; Chamberlain v. Piercy, supra note 2; Beddow v. Huston, 65
Wash. 585, 118 Pac. 752 (1911); Shuey v. Adair, 24 Wash. 378, 64 Pac. 536
(1901); In re Bass, 215 Fed. 275 (N. D. Ga., 1914); Rosoff v. Gilbert Trans-
portation Co., 204 Fed. 349 (D. Conn, 1913); Fletcher v. Bank of Lonoke,
[VOL. 16
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Washington follows this second view, but the efficie'ncy of this pro-
cedure is sometimes questionable. There is always the possibility thati
through the insolvency or other disability of one or more of the share-
holdexs, it might be impossible to collect the full assessment. This
would necessitate the receiver's bringing successive actions to recover
the amount actually necessary to offset the corporate liabilities. In view
of the language of the court in Gaunce v. Schoder.,34 it is at least argu-
able that a receiver has no authority to make an assessment call, and
that by suit for a portion of his entire claim against a shareholder,
his right to recover the whole amount has been adjudicated, with the
result that he has no right to maintain successive actions. On the
other hand, if the first view were followed and all delinquents were
joined and recovery of the full amount unpaid were permitted, the
receiver could pay the corporate debts and redistribute the excess to
the shareholders in an equitable manner, avoiding these difficulties.
After an appointment of a receiver, creditors, singly or in a group,
may not themselves sue shareholders.3 5
For a complaint against an unpaid shareholder to state a cause of
action in Washington', there must be allegations (1) as to the value
of the assets of the corporation; (2) that defendant shareholders had
notice or an opportunity to be heard on validity of claims against the
insolvent corporation; (3) that the court, after notice to shareholders,
had determined what proportion of each shareholder's subscription
remaining unpaid was necessary to meet the valid obligations of the
corporations after the assets had been exhausted; (4) that after this
finding, the court had directed that proceedings be instituted against
all such shareholders.3 6
The proceedings in receivership in which assessments are levied are
conclusive as against shareholders as a determination of the total
amount of the financial necessities of the receivership and the authority
of the receiver to sue is definitely established thereby; but it is not
conclusive as to the amounts for which each shareholder is personally
liable on his alleged unpaid subscription.3
7
The weight of authority is to the effect that creditor's suits may be
brought against one or more shareholders without making all share-
holders parties even though others are also liable. The corporation
itself is a necessary but not an indispensable party. Objection -to non-
joinder is waived if not made by demurrer or answer.3 8
71 Ark. 1, 69 S. W. 580 (1902); Dupont v. Ball, 11 Del. Ch. 430, 106 At.
39 (1918); Cumberland Lbr. Co. v. Clinton Hill Lbr. Mfg. Co., 57 N. J. Eq.
627, 42 AtL 585 (1899); Cook v. Carpenter, 212 Pa. 165, 61 Atl. 799 (1905).
" Supra note 4.
35 Guaranty Trust Co. v. Satterwhite, supra note 11; Shuey v. Adair,
supra note 33; Watterson v. Masterson, 15 Wash. 511, 46 Pac. 1041 (1896).
16 Guaranty Trust Co. v. Satterwhite, supra note 11; Hosner v. Con-
servative Casualty Co., supra note 6; Silvain v. Benson, 83 Wash. 271, 145
Pac. 175 (1915); Gordon v. Cummings, supra note 5; Grady v. Graham,
64 Wash. 436, 116 Pac. 1098 (1911); Johnson v. Pheasant Pickling Co., Rea
v. Eslick, Beddow v. Huston, all supra note 33.37 Guaranty Trust Co. v. Satterwhite, supra note 11; Silvain v, Benson,
supra note 36; Bennett v. Thorne, 36 Wash. 253, 78 Pac. 936, 68 A. L. R.
113 (1904); Johnson v. Pheasant Pickling Co., Connor v. Robinson, Rea v.
Eslick, Shuey v. Adair, all supra note 33. -3 8 BALtLAmNNE, .CorpoRAToNs' (1927) § 200; Note (1935) 33 MIcH. L. REv.
1059.
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Early Washington decisions permitted recovery by a receiver against
any one of the shareholders to the, full amount of his unpaid subscrip-
tion, providing the receiver gave notice of the assessment call before
bringing action. 9 Later cases have developed a rule requiring all de-
linquent shareholders to be joined and allowing recovery only on a
pro rata basis.
40
An actual subscription is not always necessary in order to establish
one as a shareholder. Any agreement by which a person shows an
intention to become a shareholder is sufficient to bind both him and the
corporation. When one accepts or assumes the position and duties,
and claims the rights, privileges and emoluments of a shareholder, and
the corporation accepts and acquiesces therein, such person is estopped
to deny that he is a subscriber, even though there may have been some-
thing irregular or defective in the form or manner of his. subscription
or there may have been no formal subscription at all." Holders of
unpaid stock cannot defeat an action for the balance due by claiming
that they hold such stock as a mere gratuity.42 Nor is it a defense
that the subscriber was misled and bought his stock believing that
it was fully paid and nonassessable.4 ' As between the corporation and
the shareholders, defenses of fraud, misrepresentation inducing sub-
scription, lack of full subscription to stock and organization defects
are probably good, but as between shareholders and creditors, another
rule applies, 44 and such defenses are not recognized.
In the case of "watered" stock, the basis of the right to collect is
that credit was given in reliance on the presumption that full par
value has been received by the corporation for the stock which it issued
as fully paid. The majority rule is that where it appears that a par-
ticular creditor, at the time credit was given, knew of the difference
between the, par value of the stock and the value of the property re-
ceived for it, there is no reliance and no deception. 4. Most cases put
the burden on creditors to allege and prove that they had no knowledge
that the stock was issued at an excessive valuation. 46
As to merely unpaid stock, we have seen that the theory of recovery
is based on the equitable attachment of corporate assets, while in the
39 Cox v. Dickie, supra note 6; Elderkin v. Peterson, supra note 19.
,
0 Johnson v. Pheasant Pickling Co., Connor v. Robinson, both supra
note 33; Gaunce v. Schoder, supra note 4; Note (1933) 8 WASH. L. REV. 89.
" Davies v. Ball, supra note 6; Wright v. Lewis, 161 Md. 674, 158 Atl.
704 (1932).
"- Gordon v. Cummings, supra note 5.
3 Cox v. Dickie, supra note 6.
"1 Flury v. Twin Cities Dairy Co., 136 Wash. 462, 240 Pac. 900 (1925);
Silvain v. Benson, supra note 36; Gordon v. Cummings, supra note 5;
Nat. Realty Co. v. Neilson, 73 Wash. 89, 131 Pac. 446 (1913); Cox v. Dickie,
supra note 6; Cole v. Satsop Ry. Co., 9 Wash. 487, 37 Pac 700 (1894); Note
(1935) 33 MICH. L. REV. 1059.
"Davies v. Ball, supra note 6; Turner v. Bailey, 12 Wash. 634, 42 Pac.
115 (1895); Sherman v. S. K. D. Oil Co., 185 Cal. 534, 197 Pac. 799 (1921);
Watt v. German Savings Bank, 183 Ia. 346, 165 N. W. 897 (1917); Collier
v. Edwards, 144 Okla. 69, 289 Pac. 260 (1930).
46 Gaunce v. Schoder, supra note 4; Chamberlain v. Piercy, supra note 2;
Inland Nursery & Floral Co. v. Rice, 57 Wash. 67, 106 Pac. 499 (1910);
Johnson v. Pheasant Pickling Co., Connor v. Robinson, both supra note 33.
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case of "watered" stock, the fraud theory is still followed by the ma-
jority, but the statutory obligation doctrine is attracting increasing
attention. Although an individual creditor may still bring a bill in
equity against any of the unpaid shareholders in behalf of all creditors
similarly situated, the accepted practice in Washington today is to
have, a receiver appointed to bring suit for each stockholder's propor-
tionate share of the corporate indebtedness.
JANF SUE ABERNETHY.
TORT LIABILITY OF CHARITABLE CORPORATIONS
The protective and friendly attitude with which the courts and
legislatures have viewed charities is reflected in the rule of non-
liability for torts committed by such eleemosynary institutions.' The
rationales for this exemption may be briefly classified into five main
groups. The first and most all inclusive, is the trust fund doctrine
based on an early English case and exemplified by the Massachusetts
decisions. 2 Under this theory a charitable institution can not be held
liable for the negligence of servants and employees or administrative
officials.3 Nor is the court concerned with the status of the plaintiff
as beneficiary, employee or stranger.4 The trust fund can not be diverted
from the charitable purposes for which it was intended to compensate
for one injured in the execution of these duties.
The non-applicability of the rule of respondeat superior is also
suggested as a basis for the freedom from liability.5 The public policy
behind the usual application of the rule is felt to be lacking in this
situation since the master does not profit by the employment of the
servant. An interesting variation of this rule is suggested by the New
York court which held that the master servant relationship, itself,
did not exist between the hospital and its doctors, internes, or nurses."
IThis same attitude is reflected in the tax statute granting exemptions
to charities. WASH. LAWS 1939, c. 206 § 8; REM. REv. STAT. (Supp. 1939)
§ 1111. Also see the Unemployment Compensation Act, WASH. LAWS 1937, c.
162 § 19; REm. REv. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 9908-119, and Virginia Mason Hos-
pital Association v. Larson, 109 Wash. Dec. 323, 114 P. (2d) 976 (1941),
interpreting it.
2Heriot's Hospital v. Ross was cited by the Massachusetts court as
authority for granting immunity. McDonald v. Massachusetts General
Hospital, 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep. 529 (1876). The true interpretation
of this early English case has been the basis of much discussion. See
Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n., 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915).
'Kidd v. Massachusetts Homeopathic Hospital, 237 Mass. 500, 130 N. E.
55 (1921); Rosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, 235 Mass. 66, 126 N. E.
392 (1920).
'Emery v. Jewish Hospital Ass'n., 193 Ky. 400, 236 S. W. 577 (1921)
(injury to servant); Loeffler v. Trustees of Sheppard & Enoch Pratt
Hospital, 130 Md. 265, 100 Atl. 301 (1917) (injury to stranger); Reavey v.
Guild of St. Agnes, 248 Mass. 316, 187 N. E. 557 (1933) (injury to servant);
Foley v. Wesson Memorial Hospital, 246 Mass. 363, 141 N. E. 113 (1923)
(stranger injured by negligence of ambulance driver).
5 Southern Methodist Hospital & Sanatorium v. Wilson, 45 Ariz. 507,
46 P. (2d) 118 (1935); Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98, 33 AtL
595 (1895).
6Phillips v. Buffalo General Hospital, 239 N. Y. 188, 146 N. E. 199
(1924); In Matter of Bernstein v. Beth Israel Hospital, 236 N. Y. 268, 140
N. E. 694 (1923).
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